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Abstract

Since military units often require critical hazardous materials in an expedited
manner, identifying choke points within the supply chain is necessary to improve logistic
support to front line forces. Hazardous materials are some of the most critical assets for
the war fighter, as well as the most restrictive and often most time consuming for
transportation.
This research quantifies the extent that vendor and depot supplied cargo is being
delayed at Aerial Ports of Embarkation. By looking at frustrated hazardous material at
Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina and Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, a case
study methodology is used to determine the top causes of frustrated HAZMAT cargo, the
average time shipments were frustrated and determines the vendor these shipments are
coming from. Data include documented frustrated cargo over a four month period in
2005 at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base and highlight trends. The results and
analysis of this research compare the frustrated cargo record at these bases as well as pin
pointing specific trends from the vendors that provide the cargo.
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HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CARGO FRUSTRATED AT MILITARY AERIAL
PORTS OF EMBARKATION

I. Introduction

1.1. Background
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates over 800,000 Hazardous
Material (HAZMAT) shipments occur each day and 1.5 billion tons of HAZMAT is
moved each year. (Luedtke, 2002). HAZMAT by definition is “Material that exposes one
to risk” and this material can be found in all aspects of the military (Webster, 2004).
Bombs, bullets, oil, batteries, liquid oxygen, gasoline and paint are all examples of
HAZMAT that require extra care when handling. The transportation of hazardous cargo
is a continuous challenge that requires extreme caution to ensure proper training, safety
requirements and security precautions are taken into account. HAZMAT as it relates to
the military represents a critical piece of material that allows any combat or cargo
movement to take place.

1.2. Problem
Air Mobility Command (AMC) continues to see Hazardous Material, destined to
support overseas operations, being unprepared for flight or “frustrated” at the major
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deployment locations. In general, HAZMAT transportation requires extra restrictions,
care and training when being moved with a forklift or truck. When HAZMAT is
transported by air, an even greater requirement exists for packaging, handling and paper
work requirements. Currently, the Air Force has four major airlift hubs or Aerial Ports of
Embarkation (APOE). These locations provide a meeting point or cargo collection place
for ground and air cargo transportation. Cargo that is purchased by the United States to
support the war fighter overseas is delivered by truck or mail to these four major
locations so that it can be loaded on cargo aircraft and delivered to the intended final
destination. According to headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC) cargo
management branch website, 170 items of cargo scheduled for air transportation by AMC
are frustrated right now world wide. (AMC, Jan 2006). This number represents only a
sample of critical HAZMAT stuck in transition that is vital to the troops and the mission.
How to reduce or eliminate frustrated HAZMAT at the APOEs is the primary problem
studied by this research.

1.3. Previous Research
Previous research by Ellison studied this problem and very little previous research
had been done prior to her effort. (Ellison, 2004) The findings in Ellison’s research left a
great deal of potential for further analysis and study. Ellison’s research identified
communication problems between the vendor (depot and commercial supplier) and the
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE). Her research also showed that communication and
supply requirement problems existed between the user in the field and the supplier back
home. Additionally, purchases the Government Purchase Card program was often the
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method for ordering the required cargo for the user. However, very limited
communication between the supplier and the aerial ports was identified as a cause for
frustrated shipments and or double orders. The research conducted by Ellison began the
first step to identify why HAZMAT cargo was frustrated at the aerial ports and began an
effort to look at what could be done by APOEs and commercial carriers to make cargo
more air worthy.

1.4. Research Question
The scope of this research is to look at the aerial port cargo operations directly
and determine what problem areas impede the delivery of HAZMAT. The following is
the over arching research question that is focused on throughout this study:
What are the current reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston
AFBs and what improvements can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that
will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft?
To analyze the research question more specifically, the investigative questions in
the next section ask about the specific components of the shipping process that is
analyzed in this study.

1.5. Investigative Questions
To answer the main problem of this research, the following investigative
questions have been formulated for this study. First, since the data for this study is made
from two different Air Force Bases, question one looks at how the Customer Service
operations vary. It asks: What are the major differences between the Customer Service
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Operations at Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the
transport of HAZMAT?
The next question looks at one category of HAZMAT and focuses on frustrated
cargo that comes from the major Air Force depots. The following is question two: What
are common causes for depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB?
Question three looks closer at depot frustrated cargo by analyzing how long depot
cargo is prevented from being transported to the war fighter. The following is question
three: What is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo?
The next question identifies the trends that can be seen over time to see if any
current improvements are being made. By analyzing the current published metrics,
question four determines if the HAZMAT frustration problem is improving or getting
worse. It asks: What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT performance
metrics at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB?
Question five is perhaps the most important question of the research, and it looks
closely at HAZMAT coming from vendors. The research compares the causes of
frustrated HAZMAT cargo to the vendor that supplied it. The following is question five
of the investigative questions: What trends can be identified when cross referencing
reasons for frustrated HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?
These secondary questions support investigative question five:
A.

What reasons primarily cause vendor supplied HAZMAT to be frustrated?

B.

What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT?
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In addition to these investigative questions, this research also looks at how the
current results compare to the data collected by Ellison in 2004. Difference between
current data and Ellison’s data are identified and where possible the causes are also
identified.

1.6. Research Methodology
The research looks closer at the frustrated HAZMAT problem and identifies key
components that slow down the cargo delivery process. By looking at each investigative
question, a foundation can be expanded upon to improve the supply chain process that is
slowing down the delivery of HAZMAT cargo.
Frustrated HAZMAT cargo at the key mobility hubs of Dover and Charleston Air
Force Base (AFB) are looked at very closely in this study. The research is also taken a
step further by analyzing the vendor’s specific track record at each of these locations.
More specifically, this research looks at the common reasons, length of delay and
frequency of HAZMAT frustrations at Charleston and Dover AFB. In addition, this
research project looks at how the bases fix the frustrated items and how long this process
takes.
This research also looks at the current causes for frustrated cargo and expands on
previous research. Additionally, comparisons were made between two AMC bases to
look at the different ways frustrated HAZMAT is handled. By flagging reoccurring
problems, improving the process and using suppliers that provide air worthy cargo an
opportunity to decrease HAZMAT frustrations may be achieved.
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1.6.1. Data and Analysis
Data come directly from Dover and Charleston AFB and identify the source of
incoming frustrated HAZMAT from state-side suppliers. All frustrated HAZMAT
occurrences during a four month period of time consisting of over 400 frustrated items is
analyzed to see where it came from and to see if trends exist on how this cargo is
prepared. Statistical analysis on frustrated cargo is conducted during the research and a
Chi Square analysis between commercial vendor and reason for delay is completed. By
collecting this data and analyzing it in a statistical model, trends are identified to
determine what vendors are demonstrating problems and which type of cargo results in
the longest delay. In addition, by directly contacting officials at Dover and Charleston
AFB, supplementary data was collected. Visits of each base helped identify the
HAZMAT processes and helped to accomplish comparisons. These site visits allowed
the researcher to interview key personnel who run the transportation operations and get
first hand insight to the HAZMAT frustration problems that are perceived.

1.7. Scope and Limitations of the Research
Much of the research is limited to the specific problems or issues at the time the
research was conducted. This may seem intuitive but the requirements and type of cargo
moved from one month to the next vary greatly. From a statistical point of view, it would
be easy to say that having over 400 data points is sufficient for proper research.
However, as the research shows, data collected from one year to the next, and from one
month to the next, seems to change dramatically based on the requirements and types of
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cargo being deployed. The scope of this research only analyzes a four month window
during 2005.
The same limitations apply to this research that have been seen in Ellison’s
previous research. “The necessity of the item are not studied. They are assumed to be
valid requirements.” (Ellison, 2004) This same assessment applies to this research also.
Additionally, the research only looks at the cargo that comes through the APOEs of
interest.

HAZMAT shipments have been studied at Charleston and Dover AFB. No

other AMC APOEs have been looked at and these bases act as a representative of cargo
being shipped out of C-17 and C-5 APOEs, respectively.
Commercial suppliers and commercial transportation services have been analyzed
based on those having problems providing airworthy cargo. The scope is limited to those
suppliers causing the frustration and a look at their process to improve delivery of
HAZMAT. The research does not show what portion of the cargo coming from each
vendor was frustrated, and the research only shows the frequency of shipments that a
vendor is the source of the frustrated cargo in question.
Finally, the cause of the frustration may not be because of anything the vendor or
depot did wrong. The cargo may have been shipped from the vendor or depot air worthy
but due to circumstance while in transit or in holding at the APOE, something happened
to the cargo or the documentation. This research does not study frustrations caused
because of errors during transportation to the APOE.
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1.8. Summary
Our forces that are overseas in combat fighting and dying for their country need
the required tools to accomplish the mission and to save their lives. HAZMAT items are
some of the most critical assets required for our soldiers and the most strictly regulated
for air transportation. Finding solutions that continue to decrease the existing delays for
HAZMAT to depart on AMC aircraft is absolutely vital. Only by analyzing specific
details of the process can time, man-hours and money be saved and our troops be
properly re-supplied and equipped.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Overview
This Chapter reviews the literature on HAZMAT and frustrated cargo that has
been done before this study. The review focuses on studies that deal with causes of delay
and analysis of the process. A look at some of the systems in place to track frustrated
HAZMAT is reviewed and provides some of the data in this research project. The
transportation HAZMAT specialists from Dover and Charleston provided valuable
insight as to how the process was being conducted.
To gain a better understanding of HAZMAT delivery process from ordering to
departure of aircraft from CONUS APOEs, a review of Department of Defense (DoD)
and Air Force literature was conducted. This review included established and draft
policy, prior research by Ellison, and other information such as HAZMAT regulations,
training requirements in the case of paper work errors, and the published guidelines and
regulations on HAZMAT preparation. Through this review and focus on key connections,
or lack of connections, to hazardous material supply chain from ordering to delivery on
AMC aircraft, an understanding of the process will be gained. Also, data from studies
currently underway will be reviewed. These studies will show insight into the current
trends, pending guidance, and problems surrounding frustrated hazmat vendor cargo.
These studies will show what systems are in place and what, if any, improvements have
been made by these systems or programs.
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The most critical and valuable research for this study came from the data
collected at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB. These sets of data show all of the specific
items frustrated from vendor suppliers over a five month period, why they were frustrated
and what supplier provided the item.
Other sources of information were qualitative in nature and based on observations
from visits to the two APOEs of interest. This qualitative research was important and
looked at the drastic differences between the two operations. Primarily this review looks
closely at the Customer Service Section at Charleston and Dover AFB.
2.2 Terms and Definitions:
The following definitions and acronyms are commonly accepted and used as follows:
(USTRANSCOM, 2004, Eidson, 2005, Ellison, 2005):
120 Days: No Release Event – An audit of cargo listed as frustrated after 120
days. The item will be released from the system once it is confirmed that it is no
longer frustrated.
Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) – the point of arrival in a theater or on arrival
in the CONUS and generally the last node in the air segment of the DT
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) – the point of departure for shipments
entering the airlift component of Defense Transportation System, and generally
the last transit point for shipments departing the CONUS.
Airlift Clearance Agency (ACA) – Military Service representatives that approve
and validate the movement of DOD shipments via organic airlift.
APOE Damage – Damage to the cargo occurred while located at the Aerial Port
of Embarkation
Commercial carrier – a private common user shipping company. For purposes of
this process architecture, the term commercial carrier applies to organizations
providing carriage that is not managed by the Defense Transportation System (see
“lift provider”).
Container Consolidation Point (CCP) – A DLA (Defense Logistics Agency)
processing location at which government shipments can be originated,
transshipped, or integrated into larger composite shipment units (air pallets, sea

10

containers, etc). For the GPC pilot, the CCP may be the first point of entry into
the DDS.
Customer -- The ordering agent or intended recipient of the merchandise.
DDRV – Defense Distribution Depot Richmond Virginia—Provide the full range
of distribution services and information enabling a seamless, tailored, worldwide
DoD distribution network that delivers effective, efficient and innovative support
to combatant commands, military services, and other agencies during peace and
war. (DDRV, Website)
Defense Transportation System (DTS) -- The organizations, personnel, equipment
and infrastructure that are owned, operated or managed by the DOD in support of
the transportation activities within the DOD Supply Chain.
Documents Lost – Documents required for shipment were not present and had to
be completed before shipment could take place
DOD Distribution Nodes – a functional activity in the DOD organic distribution
system.
DOD Distribution System (DDS) -- The organizations, personnel, equipment and
infrastructure that are owned and operated by the DOD in support distribution
activities within the DOD Supply Chain activities. DDS is synonymous with the
phrase DOD Organic Distribution System.
Incorrect Certification – HAZMAT paperwork is present but part or all of the
paperwork is improperly filled out or is in a wrong format. Examples include
missing signature or missing/inaccurate HAZMAT identification, HAZDEC does
not have red boarder or is a copy of a red boarder. Paperwork is present but
wrong.
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name – The shipping name was not accurate and had
to be changed before shipment could take place
Incorrect Regulatory Reference – An inaccurate regulation was sited in the
shipping document and had to be corrected before shipment could take place
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA) -- group of
airline members who adopted the rules set forth by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and included additional requirements which are
more restrictive, reflecting industry standard practices or operational
considerations.
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) -- group
which sets the standards for international transport of dangerous goods by air.
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Lift Provider – this a general role term for any organization provide carriage that
is managed by the Defense Transportation System.
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS (MSDS) -- informational sheets provided
by the manufacturer to buyers of chemicals produced; information includes
chemical ingredients, physical data, fire and explosion hazard data, health hazard
data, spill procedures, product trade name, manufacturer's address, and emergency
telephone number.
Merchant -- the commercial product seller. This is not necessarily a government
contracted seller. For purposes of the study, the term merchant and vendor are
synonymous.
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, ect) – Cargo is frustrated for any
item not covered by the other categories. Examples are listed but many other
items fall into this category
Missing HAZMAT Documents – Some or all of the required HAZMAT shipping
documents were not present. Required documents had to be found or redone
before shipment could take place
Missing Signature – Required signatures for shipment were not present and were
needed for shipment
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled – This item is frustrated for not having a
specific type of paperwork that is required for time sensitive items. Items that
require dry ice such as blood fall into this category. This reason has few
examples but is important to note because often times the item can not be used
and must be destroyed.
No Documents – Required documents for shipment were not present and needed
to be found or created for shipment
No Shipping Papers/Declaration -- Shipping papers, HAZMAT Declarations, or
shippers declarations are not present or could not be found.
Other – Cargo was frustrated for a reason not covered by the other categories.
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged – Cargo is not packaged properly or the
packaging has been damaged.
Repeat Exception: Cleared in GATES – The item frustrated was identified twice
and needed to manually released from the system
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Routing and Clearance -- The group of processes that approve and authorize the
use of the DTS. Additional definitions that will add to the understanding of
shipping requirements, agencies involved, and language used (DLA DDC, 2004):
TCN – Transportation Control Number, when used as a category, something is
wrong with the TCN such as not present, inaccurate or used for a different piece
of cargo
TCMD -- Transportation Control Movement Document.
Wrong Frustration Code – Cargo was frustrated for a reason inaccurately and
needed to be fixed in the system before cargo could be shipped
Wrong Net Explosive Weight – Item is frustrated for HAZDEC having an
inaccurate Net Explosive Weight. This is an important and less frequent category
due to the danger of transporting explosives with errors that describe it.

2.3 HAZMAT Frustrated Cargo Data:
Looking at previous research by Ellison, we see how this study compares to her
findings and similar data in her research. This thesis research project looks very closely
to determine what can be improved in the HAZMAT shipping process. This study does
not look at the government travel card but does look closely at the data that was collected
as it relates to frustrated cargo at these same locations. Ellison’s data is analyzed closely
to see if it agrees with the findings in this research or if other conclusions can be made
after looking at additional data from the two APOEs.
Ellison’s research focused on many key points of importance that look at
solutions to help the cargo delivery process. The research refers to a very important
Memorandum that will also be highlighted in this research. This memo discusses the
responsibilities the vendors must follow. The research references that this memo was
distributed to many vendors to educate them on the current policy in place and how little
effect this is having. (Ellison 2004) Additionally, this research by Ellison also suggested
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that the memo should be revised to include responsibility being shared by both the vendor
and the transportation officer and that the memo does not go far enough to provide
requirements or enforce responsibility for repeated frustration occurrences. (Ellison,
2004) In fact, the research in Chapter 4 shows that no accountability exists because no
established communication bridge is formed. No requirement could be found or exists
for the Customer Service Section to respond in any particular way. Vendor’s
requirements that are viewed through this published document would therefore see this
information as an advisory and the only accountability would be based on how each
Customer Service organization runs their operation.
The Virtual Help Desk mentioned in Ellison’s research, could not be found.
(Ellison, 2004) This site was scheduled to come out six months after the close of
Ellison’s research. The website was advertised as the “one stop shop” to help vendors
find the resources required for compliance was not available in my search. However, a
similar source of help was found at the “USTRANSCOM Customer Portal” and has
many resources to include regulations. (USTRAN, 2006) This is essentially
USTRANSCOM’s home page. This site provides news and weather but also has many
useful links readily available for vendors to use.
The government purchase card (GPC) was also a major section of the previous
research. (Ellison, 2004) This program and the training requirement for members before
government cards can be issued, is essential to ensure military members are using the tax
payers money properly. Additionally, GPC program is essential for members to know
what vendors should use as a source of supply. The focus of this research will be on the
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vendor’s responsibility and not GPC program but that doe not diminish the importance of
the users responsibility and this program.

2.4 Active Performance Management
An in-depth review of a pilot program called Active Performance Management
(APM) was conducted from November 2003 to December 2005. (APM, 2005) This
system integrated Data from multiple systems, including the Global Air Terminal
Execution System (GATES), Distribution Standard System (DSS), Standard Automated
Material Management System (SAMMS), and Defense Automatic Addressing System
Center (DAASC). (APM, 2005) Coincidently, the data that APM compiled was the
frustrated HAZMAT cargo at both Charleston AFB and Dover AFB. By having access
to the data the researcher had a unique opportunity to review this raw data and compile
the data into a format that could show trends.
Simply put, this pilot program gave the researcher a large foundation of second
hand source data to conduct the research for this thesis. The data was able to be
reviewed and graphed to provide a baseline for the more specific research that was
conducted. This information was compared to the data Ellison compiled in 2004. The
depot second source data provided by APM could be compared to the vendor second
hand source data provided by Dover AFB. (Eidson, 2005) The most useful information
from this study was that it provided the frustrated HAZMAT data from the depot. The
pilot program provided data for this research but is limited in scope as addressed in
previous sections. Not only is it limited to the two bases that are being studied in this
research, but the pilot program just ended and is no longer the system being used to
monitor these HAZMAT frustration problems.
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2.5 Regulations on HAZMAT
HAZMAT is an extremely regulated and controlled item that requires very
specific detailed instructions and regulations for air delivery. The Air Force regulation
that controls this movement and packaging requirements is “AFMAN 24-204 Preparing
Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments”. (AFMC 2004) This regulation is over
500 pages long and provides the exact requirement for transportation of every type of
HAZMAT. Everything from a D-size battery to a nuclear warhead has a shipment-by-air
requirement and these requirements are detailed in this regulation. If there is any
improper documentation on the HAZMAT paperwork or if the packing requirements
deviate in any way, the cargo is “frustrated” and can not be delivered by aircraft.
When vendors receive an order from service members overseas, they have very
little knowledge of what is required by the Air Force regulations to transport these
HAZMAT items. However, vendors are responsible for making sure these items are
prepared properly for air shipment. (Ellison, 2004) In a memorandum from the Under
Secretary of Defense, before a contract can be established with a vendor for the purchase
of goods or a purchase can be made by a Government Purchase Card (GPC) holder, the
contract and delivery order must require the vendor to comply with a set of specific
“business rules”. (UndSecDef, 2003) These nine business rules explain the requirements
that any commercial vendor must agree to abide by before they will be allowed to do
business with the government. The requirements include providing standard
documentations, shipping address, provide Transportation Control Number (TCN),
ensure packing slip is posted outside the box and easy to find, make sure items are
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properly packaged to ensure safe arrival at destination, include hard copies of HAZMAT
data sheets or packing slips, package HAZMAT properly, provide In Transit visibility
(ITV) and “provide advanced shipping notice to the first point of the DoD organic
transportation system.” (UndSecDef, 2003)
The Customer Service sections at both Charleston and Dover AFBs are
responsible for ensuring these vendors adhere to the rules and the vendors are given the
proper tools and information to have the cargo prepared for continued shipment once the
item is received by the APOE. (Eidson, 2004)
In an email forwarded to the researcher by the Dover AFB Customer Service for
this study, the vendor is requesting an address from the Chief of Customer Service at
Dover AFB to send cargo too in Dover, Delaware. This item was purchased under an
approved contract. In contracts such as these, the vendor is required to know the process
and how cargo needs to be sent. When Customer Service at Dover asked very simple
questions such as the Transportation Control Number (TCN) to help identify the cargo,
the vendor did not know what that was.
Many tools exist so that vendors can determine shipment requirements before it is
sent to the APOE. (DLA 2004). The tools are readily available and the vendors should be
properly trained on how to send HAZMAT cargo properly. One site that seems the most
inclusive is the Defense Logistics Agency’s home page that has links to most tools
necessary for defense transportation requirements.(DLA 2004)
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Figure 1. Defense Logistic Agency Home Page (DLA, 2005)

Here vendors can use the tools necessary to determine what is required for
shipment to the user. Additional tools such as the Global Transportation Network, Fed
Ex, TCN tracking tools and sites used to determine packaging requirements are listed.
Many references exist and are readily available for order on disk or online for
commercial vendors to use and ensure that they are in compliance. Defense
Transportation Regulation 4500.9 provides requirements for all forms of shipping. This
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regulation includes chapter 204 that has the specific requirements for HAZMAT. (DTR,
2006) Online resources offer websites for vendors to make these purchases online and
buy the required Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR’s) or Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations. (HMR, 2006) Both of these items can be purchased for between $30
and $50 and provide many of the requirements needed for HAZMAT shipments.

2.6 Summary
This chapter looked at previous literature and tools available for HAZMAT
transportation. The tools and resources are available to support the vendor, user and
APOE and are critical sources of support to move critical HAZMAT material. This
literature review not only shows what has been studied in the past but looks at a number
of tools available for every part of the supply chain. These tools are easily accessible to
help manage and move the cargo properly. In this review, it becomes apparent that the
key to moving HAZMAT materials is the education of DoD vendors and for them to be
given the proper training and requirements so that the cargo arrives at the APOE prepared
to be loaded and delivered by air transportation.
The next chapter looks at the methodology of how this research is conducted.
The chapter will revisit the investigative questions and go over the specific process that is
used to conduct the research.
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III. Methodology

3.1 Introduction
The research focuses on frustrated HAZMAT from Dover and Charleston AFB in
an effort to determine and analyze problem areas with the quantitative data collected.
HAZMAT delivery is a top priority by our leadership due to the critical nature of this
cargo. With very little research being done in the past, this research continues to build on
Ellison’s research and opens large opportunities for future study. The lack of research is
primarily due to the difficulty in quantifying the problem areas. These investigative
questions are looked at separately to find out what impact each area has on the overall
HAZMAT cargo delivery mission. A personal look at the two separate Customer Service
section shows the vast difference in operational protocols. Analyzing causes and the
average length of frustrated cargo that are sourced from the depot shows main areas that
can be improved on from this source. Next, the research looks at overall trends seen for
HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB. Finally, a close look at
the HAZMAT coming from vendor sources shows the main causes of frustration and
what vendors are most often responsible.

3.2 Problem Statement
What current reasons are frustrating cargo at Dover and Charleston AFBs and
what improvements can be made to commercial supplier’s and carrier’s HAZMAT
packaging and delivery process that will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper to
departing inter-theater aircraft?
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3.3 Methodology
The basis for this research is to look at a problem that faces two very similar
bases. Charleston and Dover Air Force base have a very similar mission using two
different types of aircraft. From afar without looking closely at the operation, the only
difference that could be seen would be the C-17 that flies for Charleston AFB and the C-5
that flies for Dover AFB. This research started with site visits and interviews at these
two bases and visits with each Customer Service section. During these visits more
differences became apparent. Since the basis for this thesis is a close look at the
transportation operations and how HAZMAT is handled, a close personal look at each of
these bases is required. It was important to interview the Customer Service Chief for
each operation and get a first hand perspective on how things are managed. This aspect
of the research focused on how they were performing the mission and how the entire
shop perceived the operation to be handling frustrated HAZMAT shipments. To be able
to compare these two locations accurately, the qualifications and attitudes of the
personnel and their work environment was looked at. Interest in this area of the study
became noteworthy when observations identified the large contrast between the two
locations.
The research next takes a quantitative approach looking at historical data of
frustrated HAZMAT cargo at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base. By breaking down
the reasons for frustration, the most common reasons for frustration are analyzed. These
results are then compared to Ellison’s previous results to see how the most recent year
compares to the similar data that was collected during 2003-2004 research. In
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preliminary collection it was realized that no research was conducted that looked at the
differences between vendor supplied HAZMAT and depot supplied HAZMAT.
Therefore, these two categories were analyzed separately. This allowed for an accurate
picture to be illustrated that showed the different problems causing HAZMAT frustration.
Vendor frustrated cargo and depot frustrated cargo was looked at differently
based on the data that was present or provided for each base. Personnel at Dover AFB
were more able to provide records or were more willing to provide the data that was
requested. From Dover AFB, four months of data was collected that showed over 400
data points of frustrated HAZMAT. Trend analysis is used to see if anything can be
improved in the transportation preparation to make this HAZMAT more airworthy.
These data points also showed what the cargo was, what company provided the item, and
what shipper was used for delivery. By conducting a regression model with this data, the
research identifies what items of cargo are being frustrated most often. The research also
determines what vendors are having the most problems and providing frustrated cargo the
most often.
Focus is given to the entire supply chain and the research looks at how the
HAZMAT cargo was delivered. The research also looks at how this HAZMAT was
prepared and what could be improved in the ordering, production and shipping process to
improve cargo preparation to make HAZMAT cargo more airworthy when it arrives at
APOE.
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3.4 Research Approach
The initial approach was to analyze the data gathered from two APOEs.
However, once both Customer Services were visited, basic differences in how these
sections were managed became apparent. Observing how employees conduct their
customer service operations showed two very different approaches and styles to manage
the process. Informal questions were asked as to how long members have worked there
and how different situations are handled. In both cases, the answers were very different
between Charleston and Dover AFB. Although not originally intended for this research,
a qualitative investigative question was developed to analyze these differences. What are
the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at Dover and Charleston
AFB and how do these differences affect the transport of HAZMAT? This question asked
and explained the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at Dover
AFB and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the mission?
The next two investigative questions looks at frustrated cargo that comes from the
depot and breaks down what the most common causes are for the frustration. This
research provides a quantitative analysis comparing the length of delay to the causes of
the frustration. The data from Active Performance Management System compiled
through GATES shows the reasons and number of occurrences that depot HAZMAT is
frustrated. This data is broken down by base showing a break down of the most repeated
problems. The next research question takes this same data and looks at the average time
delay for this HAZMAT frustrated cargo. Outliers are identified and analyzed and the
overall delays are discussed.

The following are the second and third investigative

question: What are common causes for depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston
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and Dover AFB and what is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated
cargo?
Investigative question four asks, What trend is observed from the frustrated
HAZMAT performance metric at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB? This part of the
research shows what patterns exist and studies if the HAZMAT cargo frustration is
improving or if indications from data show the problem is getting worse. A tool called
Activity Performance Management compiles data from the GATES and GTN information
systems and displays this information in a graph for a weekly update. As mentioned
before, this system was a pilot program for Charleston and Dover AFB but served as an
excellent tool to use for the research this thesis is focusing on. The table presented in
chapter four is from the last report Active Performance Management produced and it
studies the necessity for this research by showing trends for frustrated HAZMAT.
Finally, questions were sent to the Chief of Customer Service at Dover AFB to help
analyze what is causing these trends. The questions, answers and analysis are expanded
on in chapter four.
Investigative question five analyses the specific HAZMAT frustrated cargo at
Dover AFB to determine what vendors are supplying the most frequently frustrated
cargo. A more in depth analysis is conducted to study vendors that frequently source
frustrated HAZMAT cargo. The cargo from the most frequent suppliers of frustrated
HAZMAT is looked at to determine what the most frequent cause of frustration so that
potential problems with the vendor can be identified. At Dover AFB this data is
compiled by Eidson into an Excel document on a monthly basis. Similar data including
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the same information was not recorded by Charleston AFB and is therefore not available.
The following is asked in Investigative question five:
What trends can be identified when cross referencing reasons for frustrated
HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?
A.

What reasons primarily cause HAZMAT to be frustrated?

B.

What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT?
A few adjustments had to be made to the data so that it could be sorted into a

manageable product and the “Reasons” descriptions could be better categorized:
About 50 reasons were noted from the raw data to explain why something was frustrated.
These reasons are organized into different seven categories so that a clear picture of the
problem could be understood. These reasons were broken down into the following
manageable explanations:
1. No Shipping Papers/Declarations
2. Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
3. Incorrect Certification
4. TCN
5. No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
6. Wrong Net Explosive Weight
7. Packaging Incorrect or Damaged

As many as ten different Reasons were identified that indicated something was
wrong with the Transportation Control Number (TCN). These reasons ranged from too
many digits in the TCN, too few digits in the TCN, No TCN, incorrect TCN, and
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duplicate TCN. To manage this reason in a more concise manor, anything wrong with
the TCN was changed just to “TCN” as the reason.
Many items were identified as missing paper work. Many examples existed to
include No HAZMAT Declarations (HAZDEC), improper labeling, no air HAZDEC or
missing required paperwork. Anything that was missing paperwork of any kind that was
required for shipment to be processed was labeled as “No Shipping Papers/Declaration”
An even larger number of reasons were identified that indicated the HAZMAT
cargo had the right paper work present but something on the paper work was not done
properly. Examples noted were incorrect packing paragraph, HAZDEC did not have
proper red boarder, incorrect quantity noted, no signature on HAZDEC, wrong packaging
paragraph, No shipper information or phone number, no hazardous markings and
incorrect ULN Number. All of these examples were labeled “Incorrect Certification”
Packaging incorrect or damaged was used as an explanation when something was
wrong with the packaging itself. Some reasons put into this category included packaging
was damaged, package was not sealed or properly used, packaging did not meet
requirements for transportation, in one case the vehicle was damaged and was not sent so
that it could be repaired.
The category “Wrong Net Explosive Weight” did not have many occurrences but
justified its own category because of the serious safety concern. These items were
frustrated because the total weight of explosive material was inaccurate on the paperwork
and had to be fixed before shipment.
When a number of other reasons for frustration occurred, they were categorized as
Miscellaneous. Reasons for this category could be split shipments. A split shipment is
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when the cargo present at the APOE is frustrated and waiting on the rest of the cargo to
arrive to the APOE. Another situation involved the vehicles keys being locked in the car.
Any reason that was not covered by the other six categories was listed as Miscellaneous.
These reasons were tabulated on a spreadsheet with the name of the vendors
frequency of occurrences added up. A list of these companies with two or more
occurrences is highlighted. Seven companies with the most occurrences were separated
into another chart and a break down of why these items were frustrated was tallied. A Chi
Square statistical analysis is conducted to determine if these items are dependent or
independent. These results and analysis are also found in chapter four.
Finally, the research found number of other findings and are presented in the
Additional Findings section. The 400 data points used in investigative five is grouped
into 45 day blocks of data and compared to the research conducted by Ellison. Ellison’s
data consisted of one and half months of data from 2004. this previous data is compared
to two different subsets of equal time from the most current four months of data
collected. The research and analysis of this study can be found in chapter four.

3.4.1 Reverse Approach
The approach of this research study is to review the supply chain process of
HAZMAT in reverse order to identify problems that could speed up the process and get
this critical cargo to the war fighter. The analysis looks at the frustrated HAZMAT by
looking at the cargo itself and works backwards analyzing the communication that leads
to a frustrated product arriving at the APOE. A close look to see what trends exist and
what improvements can be made to get this cargo where it is needed. Ellison discovered
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that the communication of required cargo is flowing from the troops out in the field
directly to the vendor or depot. This is telling the supplier what is needed but not how it
needs to be prepared for transportation to meet the airlift requirement. The users in the
field do not necessarily know the requirements for the cargo to be shipped and are only
able to purchase what is needed. After the cargo is ordered and delivered from the
vendor or depot, the user only knows that the cargo is in the transportation system and
often times assume the cargo is lost (Ellison, 2004). Often times the result is a duplicate
order being made due to the critical need for the cargo. Because the vendor is not
sending the item through the transportation system properly, the delay at the APOE
happens frequently leaving the lack of communication with the APOE a significant
problem. The figure XXX illustrates the current system:

Air Mobility Supply Chain
Forward Location

Dover AFB

Depot

Charleston AFB

Commercial
Vendor

Depot

Order Flow
Cargo Flow

Figure 2. Air Mobility Supply Chain
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Commercial
Vendor

Studying the communication sources, order and cargo flow, leads to identification
of trends and further recommendations in chapter four.

3.5 Data Sources
Dover and Charleston Air Force base handle most of the eastbound cargo destined
for Europe and the Middle East. Since the research of interest is to look at how that
process is run for HAZMAT material, a close look at Dover and Charleston AFB was the
primary data source for this study. During a site visit, the existing process was studied
and key officials interviewed to determine how the process was run. All of the data used
for the quantitative research was gathered from the respective Customer Service Sections
at Dover and Charleston and AFBs. The data was also limited to available information
that they had or were willing to provide.

3.6 Summary
This chapter describes the methodology used to analyze the frustrated HAZMAT
at Dover and Charleston AFB. This chapter also shows how data for vendor and depot
supplied cargo will be organized and presented in chapter four. The research
investigative questions were looked at to show how each one will be quantified and what
approach will be used to answer them. The next chapters will analyze the results of this
data, provide results, conclusions and a spring board for other research to be continued.
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IV. Results and Analysis

4.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the results the data, provided
by Dover and Charleston Air Force Base. The metrics of interest look at the frustrated
HAZMAT cargo at both locations and show various trends and analysis. The overall
research question of the study is restated and the results and analysis of each investigative
question is presented. Additionally, a conclusion and additional findings are also
presented. Two types of data were analyzed: frustration cargo from depot shipments and
from commercial vendors. In total, 615 occurrences from both sources are used for this
research from the period August to November 2005. The following is a detailed analysis
of these occurrences.

4.2 Restatement of Research Question
What are the current reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston
AFBs and what improvements can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that
will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft?

4.3 Investigative Question One
What are the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at
Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the transport of
HAZMAT?
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Significant differences are noted in the operational approach between Dover and
Charleston AFB. These differences include a very different command structure, different
approaches to how frustrated cargo is handled, as well as a difference in the overall
perspective of how the mission should be handled.
The supervisor is in charge of the Customer Service Section for Dover AFB has
been in this position for over 15 years and has provided a great deal of support to this
research project. (Eidson, 2005) A very experienced extra effort was observed in how the
supervisor runs the Customer Service Section during the four day observation period.
Among other things, the section reviews and handles all frustrated HAZMAT that comes
through the Dover AFB APOE. During an informal interview with the supervisor, the
researcher learned in detail what the job consists of on a daily basis and how the
supervisor personally handles all cargo discrepancies that come through Dover AFB.
Specifically, in most cases as a general rule, when Dover AFB has frustrated HAZMAT
cargo, and the discrepancy is determined to be the fault of the vendor, the item is sent
back to the vendor so it could be fixed.
Observations and discussions from 5 through 8 September, is when the
researcher first learned, from the supervisors perspective, that the handling of the entire
operation at Dover AFB is very different than Charleston AFB. The next week, the
researcher drove down to Charleston AFB to observe their Customer Service Operations
and to determine what differences existed.
During a similar three day observation visit, Charleston AFB appeared to handle
the Customer Service Operations very differently. The reasons for these differences are
very apparent by observing the personnel running the Customer Service Shop. The
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Customer Service section chief position is currently vacant and has been for almost a
year. A newly promoted NCO has been appointed NCO In Charge (NCOIC) of customer
service and has been “in charge” for about a month. Unlike the senior leader of customer
service at Dover AFB, the Charleston AFB NCOIC is working in this section for the first
time in his career and readily admits he is not as familiar with the operation as required.
As the senior member in charge he explained that his primary duty was learning the
operation. Many of the researcher’s questions about the operation and procedure policies
were best answered by the civilian staff assigned to the section. Two other individuals
are assigned to Customer Service Section, both government employed civilians, who
have worked in this operation for a combined 25 years.
The following figure illustrates the current chain of command structure for
Customer Service at Charleston AFB:
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NCOIC
Experience: 1 Month

GS Civilian
Experience: 10 Years

GS Civilian
Experience: 15 Years

Figure 3. Charleston AFB Customer Service Organization Chart

This figure shows the major differences in experience between the leadership and
the customer service representatives. It shows the vast differences in leadership that are
in charge at Charleston AFB Customer Service Section and no experience requirement is
in place for this very critical section.
Additional differences observed were in basic procedures and how HAZMAT
cargo frustrations are handled. The basic procedure differences between Charleston and
Dover AFB are very clear. In most situations and as a matter of policy, when an item
delivered to Dover from a vendor is frustrated for discrepancies caused by the vendor, the
item is sent back for the vendor to fix. Eidson explained that vendors will continue to
have problems providing cargo in the proper air-worthy configuration unless they realize
what they did wrong. In drastic contrast, when HAZMAT cargo is frustrated at
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Charleston AFB, the discrepancies are fixed when ever possible and shipped right away.
The rational is that the war fighter needs these HAZMAT items quickly and the quickest
way to fix the frustrated item is to fix the discrepancy so the cargo can be transported
sooner.
The most interesting detail about these findings is that both bases are aware of
how the other base handles the customer service operation. Both customer service offices
equally stood behind how they manage their operation and strongly criticized how the
other base handles theirs. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages that are very
clear and have rippling ramifications through out the entire supply chain. The
advantages of sending cargo back to the vendor force them to fix the problem that they
created and learn from the mistake of sending cargo improperly. The disadvantage is that
the critical cargo destined for the war fighter is delayed and the increased shipping cost is
incurred by sending the cargo back to the vendor. A copy of the memorandum published
by the Under Secretary of the Air Force explaining vendor requirements is often
accompanied (Ellison 2004). The advantages to fixing the problem on site are that the
cargo is delivered to the war-fighter quicker but the vendor is never corrected for sending
the cargo improperly. The quantitative data on cargo delay times in the sections below
supports these unit level policies and the investigative questions below analyze these two
very different approaches.

4.3.1

Investigative Question One: Analysis

From the research conducted at both locations, it seems apparent that the
Customer Service Section is the most important section for HAZMAT Transportation
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Management in the Aerial Port. They represent the Air Force as the link between civilian
vendors and deployed forces overseas for HAZMAT shipments. Furthermore, Customer
Service controls the data of all cargo coming through and is charged with the
responsibility to educate commercial vendors on DoD HAZMAT shipping procedures.
At the very least, the Customer Service Section is responsible for providing tools to
vendors so they can educate themselves. This requirement is the shipper’s responsibility
to deliver the cargo in the proper method and it is required that the shipper pay for the
expense (AFMAN 24-204, 2001).
For a section as important as the Customer Service Section, providing highly
trained and experienced individuals should be a top priority. Much of the data collected
for research was provided by Dover’s Customer Service. However, collecting data and
required metrics is not universally accepted and varies between locations. A uniformed
standard between Aerial Ports for information gathering on frustrated HAZMAT
shipments and customer service requirements for handling frustrations seems to be the
most lacking element to making aerial port customer service operations a standardized
success.

4.4 Investigative Question Two
What are common causes for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston and
Dover AFB?
Below is data compiled from Active Performance Management System (APMS)
through the Gates information system, that shows in descending order, the “Reasons” and
“number of occurrences” that depot HAZMAT is frustrated. This cargo comes from all

33

of the depots in the United States or over two dozen locations. (Eidson, 2006) This data
is separated by base and shows a breakdown of the most repeated problems at each
location. The 92 total occurrences between the two bases is from a four month period
between 1 August to 31 November 2005. Some of the data included in this timeframe is
from frustration occurrences which began as early as March 2005 but are in the system
during the four months represented.
A definition of the “Reason” can be found in the Literature Review to help
identify what the problem consists of. Currently, the most common reason cargo is
frustrated at Charleston AFB is for an Incorrect Regulatory Reference. This indicates
that part of the HAZMAT paperwork is not accurate and the paperwork needed to be
corrected before the cargo could be released from frustration.

Table 1. Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Charleston AFB
Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences by Type: Charleston Air Force Base
Reason
Number
Percent
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
10
27.78%
Not Regulated
9
25.00%
No Documents
8
22.22%
120 Days: No Release Event
3
8.33%
APOE Damage
3
8.33%
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name
1
2.78%
Missing Signature
1
2.78%
Other
1
2.78%
Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates
0
0.00%
Wrong Frustration Code
0
0.00%
Total
36
100.00%

Table 2 shows the same information for Dover AFB during the same time frame
of four months. The most common reason cargo was frustrated at Dover AFB was for

34

No Documents. This indicates that either the HAZMAT, shipping or some other
paperwork is not present and needed to be found or completed be the cargo could be
released from frustration.

Table 2. Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Dover AFB
Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences by Type: Dover Air Force Base
Reason
Number
Percent
No Documents
10
17.86%
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
9
16.07%
Other
8
14.29%
Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates
7
12.50%
Not Regulated
6
10.71%
Missing Signature
5
8.93%
120 Days: No Release Event
5
8.93%
Wrong Frustration Code
3
5.36%
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name
2
3.57%
APOE Damage
1
1.79%
Total
56.00
100.00%

4.4.1

Investigative Question Two: Analysis

Both bases appear to have similar reasons and frequency for occurrences. Dover
AFB had more occurrences but this could be explained by the larger quantities of Depot
cargo coming through this APOE. 15 of the 92 exceptions are from human error due to a
previously frustrated item not being released from the system or for a single frustrated
occurrence being entered twice. These items are part of the “Reason” category “120
Days: No Release Event” and “Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates” respectively. It is
important to note that 12 of these 15 occurrences are from Dover AFB. Nine occurrences
are in the category “other” and apply to any frustration that does not fit into this category.
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Examples range from keys locked in the vehicle to the shipment being incomplete and
waiting for additional cargo.

4.5 Investigative Question Three
What is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo?
The tables below show the most common causes and average number of days for
depot frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB in the months of August and
September 2005. These cause for frustrated cargo were chosen because they represent
the most significant causes for delay and are therefore the most significant to focus on.
The first Table below is for Charleston AFB and has examples of delay for five of the
eight categories.

Table 3. Average Delay Depot Cargo is Frustrated:
Charleston AFB (2 Months)
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Charleston AFB-Aug-Sep 2005
Reason
Average Delay
Other
44.1
No Documents
3.0
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
2.4
Not Regulated
2.0
APOE Damage
0
Missing Signature
0
Repeat Exception
0

The most significant cause for delay listed as other is “120 Days: No Release
Event” of 44 days. It is important to note that this is not frustrated HAZMAT cargo.
This is a previously frustrated item that was not cleared from the system when the
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original frustration problem was fixed. The frustrated item was fixed but Gates never
tracked the cargo leaving and does not have accountability of the cargo. If the item is not
found anywhere at the APOE and is still in the system as not sent, it falls into this
category. It is assumed the item was either shipped overseas or back to the vendor. The
next table shows the same data for Dover AFB during the identical time frame. Dover
AFB had examples of eight different reasons for frustrated HAZMAT cargo and the
average time delay is represented.

Table 4. Average Depot Delay Cargo is Frustrated:
Dover AFB (Two Months)
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Dover AFB-Aug-Sep 2005
Reason
Average Delay
Other
13.3
No Documents
5.7
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
5.8
Repeat Exception
5.4
Missing Signature
3.6
Not Regulated
1.8
APOE Damage
1.7

Analyzing the data shown in Tables 3 and 4, causes for depot frustrated cargo is
significant at Charleston AFB and not as significant at Dover AFB. The data consists of
frustrated cargo from August 2005 to September 2005. Examples of the “120 Day” no
release have occurred at Charleston AFB and is an example of Gates not being updated
properly and the cargo’s location unknown. Comparing the two tables seems to confirm
how the finding in Investigative Question One, due to the longer delay’s at Dover AFB.

37

When this data is expanded from a two month period to a four month period, a different
look is represented. When the data is expanded, it appears to smooth out the results and
causes of frustration. Table 5 below shows the most common causes and average
number of days for depot frustrated cargo at Charleston for the four month period from
August 2005 to November 2005:

Table 5. Average Delay Depot Cargo is Frustrated:
Charleston AFB (Four Months)
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Charleston AFB- Aug to Nov 2005
Reason
Average Delay
APOE Damage
58.0
Not Regulated
7.7
Missing Signature
6.3
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name
4.9
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
4.1
No Documents
3.0
Other
0.2
Wrong Frustration Code
0

In this data set, Charleston AFB has a number of different reasons that were not
represented in the previous table. Six categories represent Average Delay’s of four days
or more. The reason “APOE Damage” is skewed by one item that was damaged on site.
This cargo was a vehicle that could not be moved till damage caused by a minor accident
was fixed. Table six below shows data for the same four month period at Dover AFB.
Like Charleston AFB, the table shows the most common causes and average number of
days for depot frustrated cargo for a four month period from August 2005 to November
2005:
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Table 6. Average Delay Cargo is Frustrated: Dover AFB (Four Months)
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Dover AFB – Aug to Nov 2005
Reason
Average Delay
Wrong Frustration Code
13.05
No Documents
5.77
Other
5.35
Not Regulated
4.51
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name
3.63
Missing Signature
3.59
Incorrect Regulatory Reference
3.49
APOE Damage
1.73
Missing HazMat Documents
0.00

Similar to Charleston AFB, the data is much more smoothed and has examples of
frustration from most reason categories. The longest delay was caused by entering the
wrong frustration code that was frustrated for some other reason. When an error is
created by documenting the error wrong, time is wasted to fix a problem that does not
exist and than the actually frustration cause needs to be fixed. The next section below
analyzes the most significant findings and analysis of this data.

4.5.1

Investigative Question Three: Analysis

Although not confirmed with the Customer Service sections at Dover and
Charleston AFB, the data for Research Question Three supports the findings from
Research Question One. For eight of the nine reasons cargo is frustrated at Dover and
Charleston AFB, the delay is longer at Charleston AFB. Six of these nine categories and
most of the reasons represented in this data, are caused by the depot not providing the
cargo with proper paper work or the paper work not being properly completed. The next
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research question looks at the trends over time to see if HAZMAT cargo frustration rates
are improving or if the problem is getting worse.

4.6 Investigative Question Four
What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT performance metrics at
Charleston AFB and Dover AFB?
Below is a table that shows a Frustration Summary report provided by Gates and
APM that illustrates the number of New and Resolved Frustrations for each week. The
data on the left axis shows the number of HAZMAT frustrated shipments. On the right
axis is the percentage of HAZMAT that is frustrated. This data is displayed by week and
is separated into three categories for “New” Frustrations shown in red, “Resolved”
frustrations shown in yellow and “Open” frustrations shown in Blue. This metrics is a
combined set of data for Charleston and Dover AFB and was used during the weekly
tele-conference APM meetings between the two bases as well as the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA). Below is the final table for the last APM meeting that concluded the
APM test evaluation in December, 2005.

40

Table 7. Frustrated HazMat Shipments: Dover and Charleston (APM, 2005)

30%

50
New

45

Resolved

25%

Open

40
35

15%

25
20

Percentage Frustrated

Frustrated Shipments

20%
30

10%
15
10

2%

2%
0%
21-Nov

14-Nov

7-Nov

31-Oct

17-Oct

1%
10-Oct

0%

3-Oct

26-Sep

19-Sep

12-Sep

5-Sep

29-Aug

0

2%

1%

1%

2%

1%

24-Oct

2%
1%

5%

5%

4%
5

APM Pilot Weeks

Data Source: GATES to APM Data Feed. Frustration Detail Extract 25 November 2005 (midnight)

4.6.1

4

Investigative Question Four: Analysis

The Frustration Summary Metrics Report initially shows very consistent
performance; with a low number and percentage of frustrations occurring each week.
These frustrations appear to be matched by resolutions that keep the number of open
frustrations minimized. However, the last few weeks show a significant pattern of Open
items of frustrated HAZMAT. Specifically, a large number of frustrations the week of 24
October have generated a spike in the backlog of open exceptions at Dover and
Charleston AFB. The table shows the percentage of frustrated cargo has spiked for
Dover and Charleston AFB, doubling and even tripling open items in a one month time
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frame. It is important to re-emphasize that this data is coming from APM which was in a
test period at the time and ended 1 December 2005. The validity of this data may be
questionable but illustrates that the Air Force is trying to find a product that can show a
clear picture of frustrated HAZMAT problems. However, the data could illustrate a
significant problem and a back log of frustrated HAZMAT. When the chief of customer
service at Dover AFB, was asked why the surge existed, the response was:
We usually get a surge of cargo in the middle of Oct thru Nov. Then it
tapes off somewhat over the holidays. It slows down middle of August
thru September due to the fiscal year. The transportation account codes
(TAC) have to be revalidated each year for funding. Many holders of
TACs don’t revalidate in a timely manner and they don’t have any money
to ship. So, therefore, they start shipping in October all their backed up
requisitions. This causes the surge. (Eidson 2006)
4.7 Investigative Question Five
What trends can be identified when cross referencing reasons for frustrated
HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?
A.

What reasons primarily cause vendor supplied HAZMAT to be frustrated?

B.

What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT?
Table eight shows the frequency and reason vendor sourced HAZMAT at Dover

AFB was frustrated from 1 August to 31 November 2005. The 423 data points of
frustrated HAZMAT are separated and categorized into one of these eight areas of major
concern. This data is used to illustrate why the cargo was frustrated and what were the
most common problems.
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Table 8. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments: Dover AFB (Eidson 2006)
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005
Reason
# Shipments
% of Total
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
67
15.84%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
45
10.64%
Incorrect Certification
105
24.82%
TCN
191
45.15%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
2
0.47%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
7
1.65%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
6
1.42%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments
423
100.00%

The most significant problem noted in the table above is that something is wrong
with the Transportation Control Number (TCN). The cargo is arriving to the APOE from
the vendor with the TCN either missing or inaccurate. This TCN number is used in Gates
so that the cargo can be tracked properly and to ensure the cargo is not lost in the
transportation system. Most of these items of frustrated cargo can be attributed to the
vendor making some error that caused the frustration and the delay. The following table
takes the same 423 items of vendor sourced frustrated HAZMAT and begins to look at
the vendors that provided this cargo.
Table 9. Frustrated Vendor Sourced HAZMAT
# of Frustrated Occurences
# of Vendors
Average Frustrationed Cargo Per Vendor
Standard Deviation of Frustrated Cargo Per Vendor
Maximum Occurences
Minimum Occurences

423
225
1.88
3.59
37
1

A very large number of vendors have examples of frustrated cargo during this
four month time frame. 225 vendors provided the 423 instances of frustrated HAZMAT.
Furthermore, each vendor had an average of 1.88 occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT
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during this time. 50 of the 225 vendors had two or more occurrences and are shown in
Table 10. This data analyzes the specific vendor and shows how many occurrences of
frustrated HAZMAT each company had during this four month period. 175 companies
are not mentioned and had only one occurrence of frustrated HAZMAT during this time
period.

Table 10. Frustrated HAZMAT Occurrences at Dover AFB for each Vendor
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005
Vendor
Occurences % of Frustrated Cargo
TOTAL
423
100.00%
GSA
37
8.75%
UNKNOWN
29
6.86%
THE INSITU GROUP
23
5.44%
HONEYWELL
11
2.60%
CUMMINS
10
2.36%
LOCKHEED MARTIN
10
2.36%
UNIVERSAL PROPULSION
8
1.89%
GTSI CORP
6
1.42%
KBR SERVICES INC
6
1.42%
ALLOY SURFACES CO
5
1.18%
GRAINGER
5
1.18%
ATK THIOKOL INC
4
0.95%
GATEWAY
4
0.95%
MCDOWELL RESEARCH
4
0.95%
OFFICE DEPOT
4
0.95%
RSPC
4
0.95%
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES
3
0.71%
CDW-G
3
0.71%
DCMA
3
0.71%
DELL COMPUTER
3
0.71%
KIDDE
3
0.71%
LAB SAFETY SUPPLY
3
0.71%
NORTHROP GRUMMAN
3
0.71%
RAYTHEON MISSILE SYS
3
0.71%
SANDSTRON PRODUCTS
3
0.71%
SQUARE ONE ARMORING
3
0.71%
ABBOTT LAB
2
0.47%
ADVANCE SCIENTIFIC
2
0.47%
BENCO DENTAL SUPPLY
2
0.47%
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DAY & ZIMMERMAN
DTST
EAST TEXAS LIGHTHOUSE
GOVT SCIENTIFIC
GOVT SCIENTIFIC SOURCES
HARRIS CORP
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIES
J&L INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY
JC WHITNEY
JUNIPER ELBOW CO
MSC INDUSTIRAL SUPPLY
NEW BEGINNINGS
NOBLE SALES STORE
OFFICE ZONE
OLVA
PHOENIX REMANUFACTURED
ROBERTS RESEARCH LAB
SKYLAND
THERMO ELECTRON CORP
ULINE INC
WERNER
Other Companies With One Occurrence

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
175

0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
41.37%

Table 10. (Continued)

The data show that close to 59% of the frustrated HAZMAT comes from 22% of
the vendors. Additionally, 40% of the frustrated HAZMAT comes from 7% or 16 of the
225 vendors. The table eleven looks at the top six vendors that have provided 21.5% of
the frustrated cargo at Dover AFB. Frustrated cargo coming from an Unknown source
was grouped together and is also presented.

45

Table 11. Vendors Providing Frustrated HAZMAT Most Frequently
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005
Vendor
Frequency % of Frustrated Cargo Reason Frequency
TOTAL
128
37
8.75%
GSA
37
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
8
Miscellaneous
9
Incorrect Certification
16
TCN
2
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
2
29
6.86%
UNKNOWN
29
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
10
Miscellaneous
3
Incorrect Certification
4
TCN
11
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
1
23
5.44%
THE INSITU GROUP
23
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
23
TCN
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
11
2.60%
HONEYWELL
11
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
1
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
TCN
10
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
10
2.36%
LOCKHEED MARTIN
10
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
4
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
2
TCN
2
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
1
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
1
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
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CUMMINS
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
TCN
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
UNIVERSAL PROPULSION
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
TCN
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged

10

2.36%

10
1
9

8

1.89%

Table 11. (Continued)

4.7.1

Investigative Question Five: Analysis

The last table illustrates the greatest significance when analyzing research
question five. The data clearly appears to be independent with each vendor represented
appearing to have very different problems leading to the HAZMAT cargo being
frustrated. Bad TCN’s seem to be the most reoccurring reason. This was also shown in
the first table. However, “No Shipping/Declarations” and “Incorrect Certification” are
also seen in large frequency for specific vendors. These vendors each appear to have
points of emphasis that could be reviewed to improve the particular problem.
An interesting finding is that the largest source of frustrated HAZMAT comes
from the Government Service Administration (GSA) and represents 8.75% of all
frustrated HAZMAT. It could be easily be argued that the largest source of frustrated
HAZMAT comes from a vendor that should be most familiar with the HAZMAT cargo
delivery requirements. To fully understand the significance, further analysis is required
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8
8

to determine the overall percentage of HAZMAT that comes from GSA. This is one
organization that should be familiar with government regulations set by The Department
of Transportation.
Cargo coming from an “Unknown” source could mistakenly represent a control
group for this study since no specific vendor could be identified. However, cargo coming
from an Unknown source would have specific reasons for the frustration that directly
relate to the vendor being undetermined. Specifically, if the vendor is unknown often
times this would mean that the shipping papers could not be found to identify what
company sent the cargo. The next section analyzes additional findings of the study and
also compares data collected in this research to similar data collected by Ellison two
years ago.
This data is analyzed into a statistical model that could better understand the
validity of this model. A hypothesis test determined if vendors were most likely to have
various reason for frustrated cargo or if the different vendors generally the same
problems. A null hypothesis was tested (Kaziska, 2006)
H0: Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are independent; versus the alternative
Ha: Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are not independent.
The results of this analysis conducted by Kaziska proved to be significant and the
entire results are published in Appendix B.

4.8 Additional Findings
Previous research showed what the largest problems were for frustrated cargo in
2004. This research is reviewed and compared to the most current data available in this
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study. By comparing identical lengths of time from two different years, we can see if any
differences exist. Data Table 12 below is from Ellison’s research and shows what the
most common reasons and frequency HAZMAT was frustrated at Dover AFB. This data
was collected from 1 June to 17 July 2004.

Table 12. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 June - 17 July 2004
(Ellison, 2004)
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 June through 17 July 2004
Reasons
# Shipments
% of Total
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
29
40.28%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
20
27.78%
Incorrect Certification
9
12.50%
TCN
5
6.94%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
3
4.17%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
3
4.17%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
3
4.17%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments
72
100.00%

These data are compared to the most current information provided by Dover AFB
to see if differences exist. The first of the following three tables looks at the data for a
four month period. Table 13 shows the most current data available and analyzes
frustrated vendor HAZMAT from 1 August to 31 November 2005:
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Table 13. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August – 31 November 2005
(Eidson, 2006)
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005
Cause
# Shipments
% of Total
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
67
15.84%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
45
10.64%
Incorrect Certification
105
24.82%
TCN
191
45.15%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
2
0.47%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
7
1.65%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
6
1.42%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments
423
100.00%

Table 13 above looks at the most current data compiled during a four month
period. Since the data in Ellison’s research looks at one and a half months of data or 46
days, this four month data set is broken down into two separate groups looking at a
identical lengths of time. The following table breaks down the four month data set into a
similar comparison from 1 August to 16 September 2005 or 46 days:

Table 14. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August - 16 September 2005
(Eidson 2006)
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 16 September 2005
Cause
# Shipments
% of Total
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
26
16.35%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
16
10.06%
Incorrect Certification
47
29.56%
TCN
60
37.74%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
1
0.63%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
6
3.77%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
3
1.89%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments
159
100.00%
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A similar comparison is made for the same amount of time but with a different
segment of data. The following table breaks down the four month data set into a similar
46 day comparison from 1 October to 16 November 2005.

Table 15. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 October - 16 November 2005
(Eidson 2006)
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 October through 16 November 2005
Cause
# Shipments
% of Total
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
27
15.52%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
20
11.49%
Incorrect Certification
31
17.82%
TCN
92
52.87%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled
1
0.57%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight
1
0.57%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
2
1.15%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments
174
100.00%

Comparing the total frustrated HAZMAT shipments in Table 14. and Table 15. to
the data presented by Ellison in Table 12, the initial indication is that frustrated
HAZMAT is a growing problem. Comparing Table 12 to 14 shows a 121% increase in
the total frustrated cargo. Comparing Table 12 to 15, shows a 142% increase in the total
frustrated cargo. The explanation by the chief of customer service at Dover AFB once
again offers the explanation that a surge occurs in the middle of October through
November before going back down before the holidays. (Eidson, 2006)
This would indicate that the fiscal year budget and the lack of timely TAC code
updates are causing a strain on the Dover AFB transportation system which causes
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frustration. A complete set of data for the entire fiscal year would need to be compiled
for a more accurate understanding and study of this potential problem. Analyzing
frustrated HAZMAT data from all 12 months would be the only way to confirm these
findings and that data was not made available when requested since the detailed records
provided have just been collected since 1 August through 31 November 2005.
Since HAZMAT requires such precise packaging, labeling and paperwork
requirement, the lack of communication between everyone involved appears to be the
leading cause of the delivery delay. As the first research question indicated, no standard
relationship or communication process exists between the vendor and the APOE. The
data collected at Dover AFB is not an Air Force requirement and they are compiling this
data on their own. Similar data at Charleston AFB is available but it is currently not
compiled in a format that can be easily analyzed. In either case, no one is standardizing
the data between locations or scrutinizing the information in such a way so that vendors
and depots could be looked at closer to see if an increasing trend or on going problem
exists.
In Chapter Three, the research looked at the current system that cargo delivery
and communication is being conducted. The units or users in deployed locations are
ordering the cargo. The vendor is sending the cargo to the APOE and the APOE is
frustrating any cargo with problems or sending it back to the vendor to be fixed. By
looking at the cargo coming from these supply sources, a communication bridge can be
created between the APOE and the supplier. This bridge could be established and
required by both the APOEs and the vendors who provide cargo. Figure 4 below shows
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this proposed communication bridge and represents a better alternative to the current
system shown in Figure 2.

Air Mobility Supply Chain
Forward Location

Dover AFB

Charleston AFB

Commercial
Vendor

Depot

Depot

Commercial
Vendor

Communication Flow
Cargo Flow

Figure 4. Improved Air Mobility Supply Chain

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, over two dozen depots all over the country
are sources of cargo that come through Dover and Charleston AFB. (Eidson, 2006) In
the case of Dover AFB, these depots are major sources of cargo that support the channel
missions destined for Baghdad, Iraq to support our troops. When frustrated HAZMAT
sourced from depots is compared to frustrated HAZMAT sourced from vendors, a drastic
difference is observed. Table 16 and 17 below shows the entire depot frustrated
occurrences at Dover and Charleston AFB compared to all of the vendor frustrated
occurrences at Dover AFB.
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Table 16. Percentage of Depot Frustrated Occurrences: Dover and Charleston AFB
(Eidson 2006)
Percentage of Depot Frustrated Occurrences: Dover and Charleston Air Force Base
Reason
Percent
Number
Incorrect Certification
30.43%
28.00
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
29.35%
27.00
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
19.57%
18.00
Not Regulated
16.30%
15.00
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
4.35%
4.00
Total
100.00%
92.00

Table 17. Percentage of Vendor Frustrated Occurrences: Dover AFB (Eidson 2006)
Percentage of Vendor Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Dover Air Force Base
Reason
Percent
Number
TCN
45.15%
191
Incorrect Certification
26.48%
112
No Shipping Papers/Declarations
15.84%
67
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.)
11.11%
47
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged
1.42%
6
Total
100.00%
423

With 45% of the frustrated HAZMAT being caused by TCN, a clear problem
exists with TCN errors from vendors. As mentioned before, this could be an incorrect
TCN, a missing TCN or the TCN being used with the wrong cargo. This is 191 pieces of
frustrated HAZMAT in four months that could be avoided if the vendor could be
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educated on how to use a TCN properly or know not to ship an item until a TCN has been
established.

4.9 Summary
In summery, the research demonstrates many different approaches to analyzing
problems that have no easy solutions. The importance of resolving frustrated HAZMAT
problems properly and as fast as possible could not be over emphasized. However, the
different variables and factors slowing down the delivery process are extremely complex.
This analysis is not an attempt to highlight one cause of concern or emphasize any
particular problem as the main hold up in the HAZMAT delivery process. The emphasis
of this research is to identify causes of concern and analyze the problem in a way that has
not been looked at before. Additionally, the research looked closely at some possible
solutions that could be expanded on in the future. Simply put, if we could get all of DoD
vendors and APOEs communicating and working the delivery of HAZMAT the same
way, the problems could be better defined and clearer solutions could be identified. By
highlighting many causes and sources of frustrated HAZMAT, further research can work
toward fixing the problem areas. The next chapter looks at some of these opportunities
for further research, and makes final conclusions about this research effort.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the research and analysis conducted in this thesis. It
answers the research question through the investigative questions and makes
recommendations for action. Finally, suggestions for further research efforts are offered
to better understand and improve the time delays of frustrated HAZMAT within the
supply chain.
5.2 Research Summary
This research set out to answer the following question: What are the current
reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston AFBs and what improvements
can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that will allow cargo to move faster
and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft?
Five investigative questions followed to fully address the different factors of this
issue. To answer the main problem of this research, the following investigative questions
have been formulated for this study. What are the major differences between the
Customer Service Operations at Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences
affect the transport of HAZMAT? What are common causes for depot HAZMAT
frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB? What is the average time delay for
Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo? What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT
performance metric at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB? What trends can be identified
when cross referencing reasons for frustrated HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the
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cargo? What reasons primarily cause HAZMAT to be frustrated? What commercial
vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT? In addition to these
investigative questions, this research also looked at how the current results compare to
the data collected by Ellison in 2004. Difference between current data and Ellison’s data
are identified and where possible the causes are also identified.
5.3 Findings
It appears that the greatest opportunity to improve the HAZMAT frustration
delivery process is to continue to analyze and improve the existing process. One of the
greatest pieces of information that the researcher learned in the Air Force Institute of
Technology Logistics Management Program is that the entire Supply Chain pipeline is
never perfect and opportunities for improvement always exist. The Customer Service
Sections that manage the HAZMAT frustration problem are the only point of contact
with the vendors and with the depot. Each of these sections is working as separate
organizations and representatives for their respective APOE. Customer Service Section
is practicing the best business practices as they see it and as they have determined it
should be. Just by looking at the different practice of fixing a frustrated piece of
HAZMAT at one location verses sending it back to the vendor or depot at another can
appear to be a small detail. However, each one of these sections is making dramatic
decisions that determine what everyone in the respective supply chain must assimilate
too. This one seemingly minor decision could determine how every vendor must adjust
their standard requirements. The unknowing soldier in the field would certainly know the
difference based on how long it took to get their cargo.
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Dover AFB had detailed records consisting of vendors that provided frustrated
HAZMAT. Although unanalyzed, this offered the researcher an opportunity to find out
what vendors are most responsible for frustrated HAZMAT and had the most room for
improvement. This data only existed however, because of documentation that went
above any standard requirement set by the Air Force. The data that was collected was
most useful for Investigative Question. Investigative questions that showed comparisons
to Ellisons research, trends in frustrated HAZMAT or numbers and percentages of
frustrated items, have proven to be inconclusive in some cases, due to the wide gaps in
cargo delivery numbers during the year. Trends need to be compared for years at a time
comparing the same months for each year. This data should also be compared during
times of national crisis and times of peace during periods when similar amounts of cargo
are being processed. Therefore, this portion of the research started an opportunity that
could be continued so that more data could be collected and a better understanding of the
problems could be achieved.
HAZMAT packaging requirements are different for ground transportation versus
the more restrictive air transportation. If the Air Force and government could place more
restrictive requirements on the vendors who ship by ground, HAZMAT could be
delivered to the war fighter from the APOEs quicker and cheaper. The vendors should
not be allowed to do business with the Air Force and DoD organizations unless they
comply with the very restrictive delivery and paper work requirements of air
transportation. Since HAZMAT is such a critical and restrictive item, a Department of
Defense (DoD) issued HAZMAT certification could be required by all vendors before
commerce is authorized. This certification would require the proper training be in place
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for vendors that wish to do business with the United States military and DoD. This
training could educate on paperwork requirements such as TCN and the GPC program.
The current method that exists is in the form of a policy letter and appears to serve as an
advisory letter. No standard exists in the Air Force to determine the best business
practice between APOEs. The memorandum is not setting a standard or requirement for
depots and commercial carriers to follow.
The Traffic Management Office (TMO) at each base has a list of
certified/approved house hold goods transportation companies. These companies have
met the standard and are provided the expectations that must be met for them to continue
serving the government house hold good moving requirement. When violations to the
newly established requirement are determined, they are documented and recorded. This
documentation provides input into a track record or score that becomes a service record
or reputation for the vendor. If the service record has too many violations, these
companies can be suspended or permanently removed from the list. The opportunity to
do businesses with the US government should be a privilege. If this standard already
exists for moving military members during relocations, a similar standard Air Force wide
should be in place for moving precious HAZMAT to the war fighters overseas.

5.5 Recommendations for Future Research
Future research can take on a number of different directions. The research can be
duplicated to APOEs on the west coast such as Travis and McCord AFB and see if
similar results exist. The research could expect to see a number of different vendors and
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different types of cargo. If the communication problems exist between the suppliers and
APOEs on the east coast, then it would be fairly safe to assume that this problem exists
on the west coast as well.
At each major APOE, Dover, Charleston, Travis and McCord, interviews and
discussions with specifically flagged depots and vendors could be conducted. This
revolutionary communication bridge could be used to discuss opportunities for
improvement directly with the source of our war fighting materials. Since this research
identified problems that exist, the vendors could be asked about potential for change to
fix the repeated problems. It could also open up an opportunity to receive input from the
various suppliers. For vendors who continue to not comply, research could be done to
see if alternative sources of the item can be found at a cheaper price. If commercial
vendors are identified as unable or unwilling to change the packaging, delivery method or
price, a better source of supply could be found.
As suggested in the previous section, a standard business practice and
expectations could be established DoD wide. Some measure or standard for expectations
needs to be applied to all of the APOEs. Having each aerial port conducting business
how ever they see fit, is a wasted opportunity. Each location could share what works and
a standard could be established Air Force Wide.

5.6 Conclusion
Our troops fighting in combat are useless without the proper tools to do their job.
Businesses have learned decades ago how to maximize their profit through a stream lined
supply chain management process. They are using technology and innovative ways of
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thinking to help move goods quicker and cheaper. Fed Ex and UPS are innovative
leaders in the transportation business. The importance of our transportation mission
should make that level of cargo delivery the absolute minimum standard. DoD and Air
Mobility Command should find ways to far exceed that standard. The difference between
our job and these major corporations is that we do not make a profit and no direct
motivators for personal gain exist. The lives we save or the wars we win are not readily
apparent to the members responsible for moving this critical equipment. Therefore, the
maximized potential is not achieved.
The standard and requirements must start at the top. Leadership must require our
APOEs and vendors to learn from each other and implement a standard requirement for
everyone to follow. Only by standardizing the best solutions to the problem of
HAZMAT cargo delivery, can the highest levels of capability be achieved.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
Acronym
ADUSD (TP)
AFMAN
AMC
AMC-DDCACC IPT
APM
APOE
APS
CCN
CIO
COP
COTS
DAA
DAASC
DDC
DDRV
DFWG
DITSCAP
DLA
DODAAC
DoDAAF
DPO
DSCR
DSS
DVD
DVD IPT
EIDE
EIS
ERP
GATES
GPC
GSA
HTTP
IATO
IDE

Description
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation
Policy
Air Force Manual
Air Mobility Command
Air Mobility Command-Defense Distribution Center Air Cargo
Consolidation Integrated Process Team
Active Performance Management
Aerial Port of Embarkation
Advanced Planning System
Carton Control Number
Chief Information Officer
Common Operating Picture
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
Designated Approval Authority
Defense Automatic Addressing System Center
Defense Distribution Center
Defense Distribution Depot Richmond Virginia
Distribution Focused Working Group
DoD Information Technology Certification and Accreditation
Process
Defense Logistics Agency
DoD Activity Address Codes
Defense Activity Address File
Distribution Process Owner
Defense Supply Center Richmond
Distribution Standard System
Direct Vendor Delivery
Direct Vendor Delivery Integrated Process Team
Enterprise Integrated Data Environment
Executive Information System
Enterprise Resource Planning Systems
Global Air Terminal Execution System
Government Purchase Cards
General Services Administration
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
Interim Approval to Operate
Integrated Data Environment
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IPT
Acronym
ITV
JCS
JDPO
JFCOM
MOA
MRO
OCONUS
OSD
SAMMS
SCEM
SQL
SSAA
TCMD
TCN
TFM
USTC JDDA

Integrated Process Team
Description
Intransit Visibility
Joint Chief of Staff
Joint Deployment Process Owner
Joint Forces Command
Memorandum of Agreement
Material Requisition Order
Outside the Continental United States
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Standard Automated Material Management System
Supply Chain Event Management
Standard Query Language
System Security Authorization Agreement
Transportation Control and Movement Document
Transportation Control Number
Trusted Facility Manuals
US Transportation Command Joint Deployment and Distribution
Architecture
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
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Appendix II: Chi Square Analysis (Kaziska, 2006)

To perform a formal hypothesis test indicating whether various vendors tended to have
different reasons resulting in distressed shipments, we performed a chi square test of
independence. We tested the null hypothesis
H0: Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are independent; versus the alternative
Ha: Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are not independent.
We begin with a brief introduction to the chi square test. A more detailed explanation is
available in Box, Hunter, Hunter, Statistics for Experimenters, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
(1978), or on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/prc/section4/prc45.htm.
The idea of the chi square test as implemented in this problem is that if the reasons for
distressed shipments were independent of vendor, then the reasons would occur with
approximately equal proportions for each vendor. The test is conducted by constructing a
table whose rows list the reasons for distressed shipments and whose columns list the
vendors. Then the (i, j)-th cell of the table indicated the number of time a distressed
shipment occurred from the j-th vendor, with the i-th reason.
The observed count Oij, in the (i, j)-th cell is compared to the expected number Eij. The
expected cell count in the (i, j)-th is
Eij =

Ri C j
N

where Ri is the total number of times the i-th reason occurred and Cj is the total number of
distressed shipments by the j-th vendor. The chi square test statistic is then

χ =∑
2

( Eij − Oij ) 2
Eij

i, j

(1)

where Eij is the expected cell count in the (i, j)-th cell and Oij is the observed cell count in
the (i, j)-th cell. A large value of this test statistic indicates a large difference between the
observed and expected cell counts, which gives evidence that the rows and column are
not independent. Under the null hypothesis, and statistical assumptions of a random
sample, the test statistic has a chi square distribution with (r-1)(c-1) degrees of freedom,
where r is the number of rows in the table and c is the number of columns in the table.
This analysis was limited to the four most prolific shippers plus the packages whose
shippers were unknown; and to the four most common reasons (1. No Shipping
Papers/Declaration; 2. Miscellaneous; 3. Incorrect Certification; 4. TCN). Limiting the
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hypothesis test to these shippers and these four reasons was necessary to get adequate
sample size for this chi square test. A table was constructed with these vendors in the
columns and the reasons in the rows. In each cell of the table, the number of times each
vendor had a distressed shipment due to each reason is indicated. The chi square test
was conducted on this table of data. Following is the table:

Reasons
No Shipping
Papers/Declarations
Miscellaneous
Incorrect Certification
TCN

GSA

UNKNOWN

8
9
16
2

10
3
4
11

Vendors
INSITU HONEYWELL
0
0
23
0

1
0
0
10

CUMMINS
4
0
2
2

The Minitab output indicating the result of this test is as follows:
Chi-Square Test: GSA, Unknown, Institu, Honeywell, Cummins
Expected counts are printed below observed counts
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts
GSA
8
6.21
0.513

Unknown
10
4.97
5.085

Institu
0
4.08
4.084

Honeywell
1
1.95
0.465

Cummins
0
1.78
1.776

Total
19

2

9
4.25
5.301

3
3.40
0.047

0
2.79
2.794

0
1.34
1.336

1
1.21
0.038

13

3

16
14.07
0.266

4
11.25
4.674

23
9.24
20.476

0
4.42
4.421

0
4.02
4.019

43

4

2
10.47
6.849

11
8.37
0.824

0
6.88
6.879

10
3.29
13.687

9
2.99
12.075

32

Total

35

28

23

11

10

107

1

Chi-Sq = 95.609, DF = 12, P-Value = 0.000
13 cells with expected counts less than 5.

The conclusion for the hypothesis test comes from the chi square test statistic of 95.609,
which produces a level of significance of 0 (to three decimal places). We reject the null
hypothesis, and we have strong evidence that the vendor and the reason for distressed
shipments are not independent.
Furthermore, this output aids in interpretation of the data, giving an indication of why the
two variable were found not to be independent. In each cell, there are three numbers
shown: The actual cell count, the expected cell count, and the contribution of the cell to
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the chi square statistic. Large deviation between the actual and expected cell counts
indicate that there is a large difference between the expected cell count and the actual
count. In this context, a large contribution to the chi square statistic means a large
difference between the expected and observed cell count.
For example, for the vendor Cummins and reason #4 (TCN), the three numbers shown
are
9
2.99
12.075
The number 9 indicates the actual cell count, that is, 9 shipments from Cummins had
problems with the TCN, as compared to the expected number of 2.99 in the second row.
The number 12.075 is the contribution of this cell to the test statistic in Eq. (1). This cell
was the largest contributor to the test statistic so it had great impact in affecting the
conclusion to the hypothesis test. Additional interpretation of the large contributors to
the chi square statistic can be undertaken to understand the dependence between the
variables of vendor and reason.

66

Bibliography

Activity Performance Management System, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
Eidson Betty, December 2005
Air Force Materiel Command. Logistics Support Office. https://www.afmcmil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/LG/LSO/lol/. 20 July 2004.
AMC Headquarters. HQ AMC/A43C, Collected Data 31 Jan 2006,
https://amclg.scott.af.mil/cgi-bin/index.pl?dd=/don/lgtc/doc-errorcargo&ti=HQ+AMC/A43C+Cargo+Management
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Defense Distribution Center.
http://www.ddc.dla.mil/links.asp 2 June 2004.
Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR). DoD Regulation 4500.9, Collected Data
15 Feb 06 http://www.transcom.mil/j5/pt/dtr_part_ii.html
Department of the Air Force. Cargo Movement. Air Force Instruction 24-201.
Washington: HQ USAF/ILGD, 11 November 2003.
Department of the Air Force. Hazardous Materials Management. Air Force
Instruction 32-7086. Washington: HQ USAF/ILE, 1 August 1997.
Eidson, Betty. Chief of Customer Service, Dover Air Force Base. Personal
Interview. 10 September 2005
Eidson, Betty. Chief of Customer Service, Dover Air Force Base. Personal email
response. 30 January 2006
Eidson, Betty.(a) Chief of Customer Service, Dover Air Force Base. Personal email
response. 21 February 2006
Ellison, Vicki. Analysis of Frustrated Vendor Hazardous Material shipments with in
the defense. MS thesis, AFIT/MLM/ENS/04-04. School of Systems and Logistics,
Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, April 2004.
Kaziska, David. Analysis Support for Research Associate Professor. School of
Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson
AFB OH, 23 February 2006.
Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR’s), 49 CFR Parts 100-185, Collected Data,
http://www.nsc-dot.com/regs.html

67

Luedtke, James. HAZMAT Transportation and Security, Georgia Institute of
Technology, August 2002
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition Policy on Facilitating Vendor Shipments in
the DoD Organic Distribution System, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments. Washington, DC 23 July 2003.
USTRANSCOM Customer Portal, Collected Data 15 Feb 06
https://business.transcom.mil/customerportal/docs/main.csf

68

Vita

Captain Neil Eric Christensen graduated from Fork Union Military Academy
High School in Fork Union Virginia. He entered undergraduate studies at George Mason
University in Fairfax, Virginia where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in
Criminal Justice in August 1999. He was commissioned through the Detachment 330
AFROTC at the University of Maryland where he was nominated with a Regular
Commission.
His first assignment was at Langley AFB and was assigned to the 1st
Transportation Squadron and was the Traffic Management Officer. From November
2001 to August 2004, he was assigned to the 721st Air Mobility Operations Squadron,
McGuire AFB, New Jersey where he served as an Operations and Aerial Port officer.
While stationed at McGuire, he deployed overseas as a member of a Tanker Airlift
Control Element, establishing or maintaining Air Mobility Operations capability in
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Germany and Iraq as an Operations and Aerial Port
officer. In August 2004, he entered the Graduate School of Engineering and
Management, Air Force Institute of Technology. Upon graduation, he will receive his
Master’s Degree in Logistics Management and be assigned to Air Mobility Headquarters,
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
.

69

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

2. REPORT TYPE

03-01-2006
4.

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

Sep 2005 - Mar 2006

Master’s Thesis

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Hazardous Material Cargo Frustration at Military Aerial Ports of
Embarkation

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Christensen, Neil E, Captain, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Street, Building 642
WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT/GLM/ENS/06-02

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

Since military units often require critical hazardous materials in an expedited manner, identifying choke points within the supply
chain is necessary to improve logistic support to front line forces. Hazardous materials are some of the most critical assets for the war fighter, as
well as the most restrictive and often most time consuming for transportation. This research quantifies the extent that vendor and depot supplied
cargo is being delayed at Aerial Ports of Embarkation. By looking at frustrated hazardous material at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina and
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, a case study methodology is used to determine the top causes of frustrated HAZMAT cargo, the average time
shipments were frustrated and determines the vendor these shipments are coming from. Data include documented frustrated cargo over a four month
period in 2005 at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base and highlight trends. The results and analysis of this research compare the frustrated cargo
record at these bases as well as pin pointing specific trends from the vendors that provide the cargo.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT

U

b.

ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

U

UU

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

83
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

2. REPORT TYPE

03-01-2006
5.

Master’s Thesis

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Hazardous Material Cargo Frustration at Military Aerial Ports of
Embarkation

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

7.

AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Christensen, Neil E, Captain, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Street, Building 642
WPAFB OH 45433-7765
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

Since military units often require critical hazardous materials in an expedited manner, identifying choke points within the supply
chain is necessary to improve logistic support to front line forces. Hazardous materials are some of the most critical assets for the war fighter, as
well as the most restrictive and often most time consuming for transportation. This research quantifies the extent that vendor and depot supplied
cargo is being delayed at Aerial Ports of Embarkation. By looking at frustrated hazardous material at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina and
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, a case study methodology is used to determine the top causes of frustrated HAZMAT cargo, the average time
shipments were frustrated and determines the vendor these shipments are coming from. Data include documented frustrated cargo over a four month
period in 2005 at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base and highlight trends. The results and analysis of this research compare the frustrated cargo
record at these bases as well as pin pointing specific trends from the vendors that provide the cargo.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
c. REPORT

U

d.

ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

U

UU

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
83

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Research Impact Statement
Student
N.E. Christensen

Faculty Advisor
Bell, J

Thesis Designator
AFIT/GLM/ENS/06-02

Sponsor

Agent

Phone

Related Thesis #1

Related Thesis #2

Related Thesis #3

Keyword #1

Program

Keyword #2

Funding

Related Thesis #4

Title: Hazardous Material Cargo Frustration at Military Aerial Ports of Embarkation
Subject: HAZMAT delivery through Aerial Ports of Embarkation

Air Force Program Description:
Since military units often require critical hazardous materials in an expedited manner,
identifying choke points within the supply chain is necessary to improve logistic support
to front line forces. Hazardous materials are some of the most critical assets for the war
fighter, as well as the most restrictive and often most time consuming for transportation.
Impact Statement:
This research quantifies the extent that vendor and depot supplied cargo is being delayed
at Aerial Ports of Embarkation. By looking at frustrated hazardous material at Charleston
Air Force Base, South Carolina and Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, a case study
methodology is used to determine the top causes of frustrated HAZMAT cargo, the
average time shipments were frustrated and determines the vendor these shipments are
coming from. Data include documented frustrated cargo over a four month period in
2005 at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base and highlights trends. The results and
analysis of this research compare the frustrated cargo record at these bases as well as pin
pointing specific trends from the vendors that provide the cargo.
Subject Terms:
Hazardous Material (HAZMAT), Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOE), Frustration

